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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF 
AMICUS CURIAE 
 
The interests of amicus curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
is set forth in the accompanying Motion for Leave to File.  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Judges are keenly aware of the difference it makes when a client is 
represented by a lawyer in court. This difference is even more pronounced 
when the client is a child. As this Court has recognized, dependency 
proceedings threaten a child’s liberty interests, as “the child will be 
physically removed from the parent’s home,” and “become[s] a ward of 
the State,” facing “the daunting challenge of having his or her person put 
in the custody of the State as a foster child, powerless and voiceless, to be 
forced to move from one foster home to another.” In re Dependency of 
M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d 1, 16, 271 P.3d 234 (2012). The seriousness of these 
threats to a child’s physical and fundamental liberties compels this Court 
to recognize that Washington’s due process jurisprudence must provide 
the “‘guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings.’”1 It is only 
through counsel that children exercise the most fundamental dignity of due 
process—the right to be heard. 
                                                 
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (quoting 




SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
In determining whether children have a right to counsel in 
dependency proceedings under article I, section 3 of the Washington 
Constitution, the Court need not justify its interpretation of article I, 
section 3 through a formal Gunwall2 analysis. Using Gunwall as an 
interpretive tools rather than a rote test ensures fidelity to Gunwall’s 
central purpose—that state constitutional decisions “be made for well 
founded legal reasons”3—and encourages more robust exploration of the 
arguments that will guide principled development of state constitutional 
jurisprudence. See City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of 
Christ, 166 Wn.2d 633, 641, 211 P.3d 406 (2009) (“Gunwall is better 
understood to prescribe appropriate arguments”). 
With this understanding, amicus documents how Washington has 
already made a principled departure from federal due process in the right 
to counsel context. Article I, section 3 affords the right to counsel if either 
fundamental liberty interests or physical liberty interests are at stake. 
Compare In re Grove, 127 Wn.2d 221, 237, 897 P.2d 1252 (1995) (right 
to counsel when proceedings concern fundamental or physical liberty 
interests), with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. Of Durham Cty., N.C., 
                                                 
2 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 62-63, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 




452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981) (right to counsel 
attaches at most only when physical liberty is at stake). Washington’s due 
process jurisprudence must therefore recognize that children have a right 
to counsel in dependency proceedings, where both their fundamental and 
physical liberty interests are very much at stake.  
Finally, employing Gunwall factor 4 (preexisting state law) and 
factor 6 (matters of state and local concern), as well as policy arguments, 
amicus demonstrates that Washington law in fact already recognizes the 
critical role that a child’s attorney plays in dependency proceedings.  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. WASHINGTON COURTS NEED NOT APPLY GUNWALL 
TO JUSTIFY DECISIONS BASED ON THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
 
As this Court articulated in an opinion authored by the late Justice 
Robert Utter, Washington courts “will first independently interpret and 
apply the Washington constitution in order, among other concerns, to 
develop a body of independent jurisprudence, and because consideration 
of the United States Constitution first would be premature.” State v. Coe 
101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984). The different histories and 
purposes of the state and federal constitutions “clearly demonstrate that 
the protection of the fundamental rights of Washington citizens was 




constitution and courts that is closely associated with our sovereignty.” Id. 
at 374. “When a state court neglects its duty to evaluate and apply its state 
constitution, it deprives the people of their double security.” Alderwood 
Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wn.2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. Smith, 117 
Wn.2d 263, 283, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring) (observing 
that “[s]tate constitutions were originally intended to be the primary 
devices to protect individual rights.”). Amicus supports petitioners’ request 
that this Court rely on the state constitution to protect fundamental due 
process rights, and in so doing, continue to “develop a body of 
independent jurisprudence” in the right to counsel context. State v. 
Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (citing Coe, 101 
Wn.2d at 373-74) (in a search case, considering petitioner’s arguments 
under article I, section 7 first, rather than under the Fourth Amendment).  
Amicus urges this Court to reiterate that where, as here, litigants 
invoke the state constitution and provide an argument on which to grant 
relief, Washington courts are free to develop state constitutional 
jurisprudence without a formal Gunwall analysis to justify using our own 
constitution. Compare M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 20 n.11 (even though the 
child’s recognized liberty interests were potentially greater than those of 




not provided Gunwall briefing until her supplemental brief), with City of 
Woodinville, 166 Wn.2d at 641-42 (“A strict rule that courts will not 
consider state constitutional claims without a complete Gunwall analysis 
could return briefing into an antiquated writ system where parties may 
lose their constitutional rights by failing to incant correctly. Gunwall is 
better understood to prescribe appropriate arguments: if the parties provide 
argument on state constitutional provisions and citation, a court may 
consider the issue.”).4 Rather, amicus suggests the Gunwall factors are 
best understood as interpretive tools that may guide development of a 
particular constitutional doctrine. See State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769, 
958 P.2d 982 (1998) (“Our inquiry is no longer whether article I, section 7 
provides greater protection but, rather, does the scope of the protection 
apply to the facts of the case….Once we agree that our prior cases direct 
                                                 
 
4 This Court’s recent pronouncement in City of Woodinville is an answer to 
courts’ and litigants’ reliance on State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797 
(1988), in which this Court declined to reach the state constitutional issue on account of 
inadequate Gunwall briefing. While Wethered was “repeatedly used as the basis for 
blocking access to state constitutional arguments for lack of adequate Gunwall briefing,” 
Justice Utter’s intent in Wethered was to “steer…[the] court toward using the Gunwall 
criteria as interpretive tools rather than as a magic key to the walled kingdom of the state 
constitution.” Hugh Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional 
Jurisprudence: “Gunwall is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 37 Rutgers L.J. 1169, 1180 
(2006); see also Hugh Spitzer, Which Constitution? 11 Years of Gunwall in Washington 
State, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1187, 1205-06, 1211 (1998) (discussing how, in the nine 
years following Wethered, the decision had the practical effect of almost destroying the 
use of the state constitution, because the Court “proceeded to massively reject state 




the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall 
analysis is no longer helpful or necessary.”); Hugh D. Spitzer, New Life 
for the “Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall 
is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 37 Rutgers L.J. 1169, 1183 (2006) (the 
Gunwall factors are useful interpretive tools for defining the nature of the 
heightened protection afforded by the state constitution).  
 
II. THIS COURT HAS ALREADY MADE A PRINCIPLED 
DEPARTURE FROM FEDERAL DUE PROCESS IN THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL CONTEXT, AFFORDING COUNSEL 
WHERE THERE ARE EITHER FUNDAMENTAL OR 
PHYSICAL LIBERTY INTERESTS AT STAKE. 
 
Though the federal and Washington constitutions employ nearly 
identical language in guaranteeing due process of law, Washington has 
already construed article I, section 3 as providing more protection than the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the right to counsel context. The right to 
counsel under article I, section 3 attaches where “the litigant’s physical 
liberty is threatened or where a fundamental liberty interest…is at risk.” In 
re Grove, 127 Wn.2d at 237 (emphasis added). This is in sharp contrast 
with federal due process, which limits the right to counsel, at most, to 
situations “where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the 
litigation.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25; see also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 




right to counsel from Lassiter “are best read as pointing out that the Court 
previously had found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases involving 
incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such cases” (citing 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25) (emphasis in original)). Therefore, article I, 
section 3 guarantees counsel for parents in termination and dependency 
proceedings, due to the fundamental liberty interests at stake. In re the 
Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 137-38, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); In re the 
Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252, 254-55, 533 P.2d 841 (1975); see also 
King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 383 n.3, 174 P.3d 659 (2007) (recognizing 
that the federal due process underpinnings of Luscier and Myricks “may 
have been eroded by the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter” but 
noting that Luscier and Myricks were “favorably cited more recently in 
our case, In re Dependency of Grove”); In re Welfare of Hall, 99 Wn.2d 
842, 846, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983) (affirming that parents’ categorical right 
to counsel in child deprivation proceedings is now based “solely in state 
law”).5  
Because Washington courts already recognize that the right to 
counsel under article I, section 3 is materially different than under federal 
                                                 
5 Luscier and Myricks preceded Gunwall, which has not affected this Court’s 




due process, the sole question to be resolved is how to apply the state 
constitution.6 
 
III. RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 
IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS IS CONSISTENT WITH 
STATE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE, BECAUSE 
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS THREATEN A CHILD’S 
FUNDAMENTAL AND PHYSICAL LIBERTY INTERESTS. 
 
Because the purpose of procedural due process is to protect 
constitutionally recognized rights, a meaningful state constitutional 
analysis must examine the nature of the rights said to be protected by due 
process. Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 710-11, 257 P.3d 570 
(2011) (stating that “context matters” in a due process analysis, and 
recognizing the context of that case had to be defined by examining the 
rights implicated in an initial truancy hearing). In dependency 
proceedings, children, unlike parents, have both fundamental and physical 
liberty interests at stake, necessitating appointment of counsel to protect 
those interests.  
                                                 
6 This is the question the Court of Appeals should have addressed, rather than 
inquiring whether there was justification for independent state constitutional analysis. 




While this Court did not consider article I, section 3 in M.S.R., 174 
Wn.2d at 15-23,7 this Court recognized and articulated children’s liberty 
interests at stake in dependency proceedings, for purposes of Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). 
Dependency proceedings implicate the child’s physical liberty interests 
“because the child will be physically removed from the parent’s home,” 
and it is the child who “become[s] a ward of the State” and faces “the 
daunting challenge of having his or her person put in the custody of the 
State as a foster child, powerless and voiceless, to be forced to move from 
one foster home to another.” M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 16. “Foster home 
placement may result in multiple changes of homes, schools, and friends 
over which the child has no control.” Id. This Court concluded that “the 
child’s liberty interest in a dependency proceeding is very different from, 
but at least as great as, the parent’s.” Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added).8  
                                                 
7 This Court considered children’s right to counsel in the termination of parental 
rights context under federal due process in M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 15-23, and determined 
there was no universal right to counsel, id. at 22-23. Because the petitioner raised the 
state due process claims for the first time on appeal, id. ¶ 2, this Court declined to 
consider whether article I, section 3 required appointmentment of counsel, id. at 20 n.11. 
This Court concluded that “this case does not provide us with a vehicle to consider the 
entire scope of the article I, section 3 right in this context.” Id. (emphasis added). This 
case is the proper vehicle for full consideration of whether article I, section 3 requires a 
categorical right to counsel for children in dependency proceedings. 
8 In addition to the physical and fundamental liberty interests at stake, other 
rights are also implicated in the dependency proceeding, as articulated by S.K.-P. Supp. 
Br. of S.K.-P. at 5-6 (detailing state and federal constitutional and statutory rights to 
education, privacy, religion, culture, speedy resolution of dependency proceedings, and 




Further, children’s liberty interests at stake differ in “degree and in 
kind” to those of their parents. Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional 
Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 
663, 676 (2006). The risk of harm children face in dependency is 
irreparable. Id. While parents “may disagree with absolutely everything 
that is happening to them and their family, their cognitive awareness and 
understanding of the proceedings better enables them to survive the 
trauma. Their children, by contrast, suffer confusion and anxiety on top of 
everything else.” Id. at 677. Further, the children’s interests may be 
nuanced, existing somewhere between the binary interests of the parent 
and the state. Id.  
The child may have an interest in a limited form of state 
intervention short of removal and placement into foster care—an 
interest that is at odds with the parent’s and that can only be 
vindicated with a judicial determination of dependency. For 
example, the child’s right to remain with her intact biological 
family and her right to be safe can both be protected with a judicial 
order that permits the child to remain at home but that also requires 
her parent to attend an outpatient substance abuse or other 
community-based social service program. 
 
Id. at 678 (internal citations omitted).  
A child’s diverse liberty interests at stake in dependency 
proceedings—as explicitly recognized by this Court in M.S.R., and as 
explained by merits counsel and all amici in the case—form a principled 




determination that parents are entitled to counsel in dependency 
proceedings, where there are fundamental liberty interests but not physical 
liberty interests at stake, so too should children be guaranteed counsel in 
dependency proceedings because both physical liberty and fundamental 
liberties are at stake.9, 10 Any other conclusion creates internal 






                                                 
9 This Court has recognized that case by case-by-case determinations of the need 
for counsel are “unwieldy, time-consuming, and costly. The proceeding might itself 
require appointment of counsel.” King, 162 Wn.2d at 390 n.11. Further, without counsel, 
there is an intolerable risk that dependency determinations may be plagued by erroneous 
fact finding. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762–63, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1399–
400, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (noting the risk of erroneous fact finding in the context of 
deprivation proceedings, due to subjective statutory standards and to proceedings 
vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias). 
10 In reaching this conclusion, there is no concern that this Court will be 
“substituting [its] notion of justice for that of…the United States Supreme Court.” 
Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d at 63. As discussed above, this Court has already held article I, 
section 3 to be more protective than the Fourteenth Amendment in some right to counsel 
contexts. And, in any event, there is no federal precedent addressing whether children in 
dependency proceedings have a constitutional right to counsel. Because federal due 
process is silent on children’s right to counsel in the dependency setting, a direct 
comparison is both unnecessary and impossible. It is undeniable that while the U.S. 
Supreme Court has considered parents’ rights in the termination context, Lassiter, 452 





IV. APPLICATION OF GUNWALL AND OTHER 
INTERPRETIVE TOOLS DEMONSTRATES THAT 
PROVISION OF COUNSEL TO CHILDREN IN 
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS ENSURES THEIR EQUAL 
VOICE. 
 
The Gunwall factors help “both attorneys and judges 
systematically analyze a challenging question from a variety of angles that 
courts have always used, consciously or unconsciously, to evaluate cases.” 
Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria Tests”, supra, at 1184.11 Factor 4, 
preexisting state law, includes consideration of the myriad ways in which 
preexisting state law protects children’s liberty interests. Factor 6, whether 
a matter is of particular state or local concern, also appropriately includes 
an examination of how Washington has moved towards greater protections 
for minors in child welfare cases.  Further, pre-Gunwall decisions support 
a state due process doctrine that is more protective than under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
a. Preexisting State Law Already Recognizes the Unique Role 
Counsel Plays in a Dependency Proceeding. 
 
Preexisting state law demonstrates Washington’s recognition that it 
is only counsel who can give children a meaningful opportunity to be 
                                                 
11 Amicus here provides further discussion of factors 4 and 6 to supplement the 
parties’ state due process and Gunwall arguments. See Supp. Br. of E.H. at 7-11; Supp. 
Br. of S.K.-P. at 7-10, 8 n.10; Supp. Br. of DSHS at 22-28; see also State v. Foster, 135 
Wn.2d 441, 461, 957 P.2d 712 (1998) (citations omitted) recognizing that factors 4 and 6 




heard in the context of a dependency proceeding. Provision of counsel to 
children in dependency proceedings is consistent with Washington’s 
common law that has long championed the welfare of the child in the 
deprivation context. As early as the turn of the 20th century, our Supreme 
Court recognized the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration 
in termination proceedings. Ex Parte Day, 189 Wash. 368, 382, 65 P.2d 
1049 (1937) (“The two principles, then, the welfare of the child and the 
right of the parent, must be considered together, the former being the more 
weighty.” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Rasch, 24 Wash. 332, 335, 
64 P. 531 (1901) (“It is no slight thing to deprive a parent of the care, 
custody, and society of a child, or a child of the protection, guidance, and 
affection of the parent.”).  
Further, this Court has recognized the importance of appointed 
counsel for children, as counsel provides different and greater protection 
than a guardian ad litem. In In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 679, 712 
n.29, 122 P.3d 161 (2005), amicus argued, like amicus does here, that the 
child should have appointed counsel. Because none of the parties had 
raised the issue, the court declined to address it. Id. Importantly, however, 
the court “urge[d] trial courts…to consider the interests of children in 
dependency [and] parentage…proceedings, and whether appointing 




on their behalf and represent their interests would be … in the interests of 
justice.” Id. (citing RCW 13.34.100(6); RCW 26.09.110; King County 
LFLR 13) (emphasis added). The court noted that when “adjudicating the 
best interests of the child, we must…remain centrally focused on those 
whose interests with which we are concerned, recognizing that not only 
are they often the most vulnerable, but also powerless and voiceless.” Id. 
(quotations omitted).  
If courts are to remain centrally focused on the child’s interests, it 
is necessary that counsel be appointed to articulate the child’s actual 
interests.12 It is only counsel who, with the attendant legal training and 
ethical responsibilities, has the duty to listen to the child and articulate the 
child’s stated interests to the court.13 Without counsel, the court cannot 
fully understand what is at stake for the child from the child’s own 
perspective, and therefore is not well positioned to successfully work 
                                                 
12 See also infra note 13, explaining that a guardian ad litem is responsible only 
for advancing the child’s best interests, which can vary drastically from the child’s stated 
interest, and are necessarily a subjective determination on the part of the guardian ad 
litem. 
13 RPC 1.2(a) (requiring counsel to abide by the client’s decisions concerning 
the objectives of representation). A guardian ad litem, in contrast, has no ethical 
obligation to advance the actual interests of the child; the Guardian Ad Litem rules 
recognize that the statutory best interests of the child may expressly conflict with the 
stated interests of the child. Guardian Ad Litem Rule 2(a) (“A guardian ad litem shall 
represent the best interests of the person for whom she or he is appointed. Representation 
of best interests may be inconsistent with the wishes of the person whose interest the 




through the often complicated and nuanced solutions that might best 
protect the child’s liberty interests at stake.14 
Additionally, the history of state statutory law provides important 
context for this Court’s analysis of factors 4 and 6, as it demonstrates the 
legislature’s recognition of the unique role of counsel.15 In its 2010 
amendments to RCW 13.34.100, 13.34.105, and 13.34.215, the legislature 
added a new section that specifically found that “inconsistent practices in 
and among counties in Washington…resulted in few children being 
notified of their right to request legal counsel.” Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 1. 
The legislature’s recognition of the importance of providing counsel to 
children in dependencies in fact applies to all dependencies: 
Attorneys…have different skills and obligations than guardians ad 
litem and court-appointed special advocates, especially in forming 
a confidential and privileged relationship with a child….Well-
trained attorneys can provide legal counsel to a child on issues 
such as placement options, visitation rights, educational rights, 
access to services while in care and services available to a child 
upon aging out of care. Well-trained attorneys for a child can: 
                                                 
14 Consider how Judge Erik Pitchal, who, when an advocate at Legal Aid 
Society, represented two brothers in dependency proceedings and was able to achieve his 
clients’ objective to “get them out of that ‘crazy foster care system’ and reunite them with 
their Aunt.” Pitchal, supra, at 665. He “served discovery demands and interrogatories on 
the agency and showed up at the hearing with two banker’s boxes of documents and 
lengthy notes for cross-examination of the caseworker.” Id. His advocacy materially 
affected the outcome of the proceedings: “[t]he judge was shocked, the agency attorney 
was not interested in a fight, and we settled the case….[the brothers] were soon on their 
way to South Carolina with the aunt.” Id. The brothers “were together, they were with 
family, and they had some measure of peace.” Id. 
15 Gunwall itself explains that state statutes assist in determining what the proper 




(a) Ensure the child’s voice is considered in judicial proceedings; 
(b) Engage the child in his or her legal proceedings; 
(c) Explain to the child his or her legal rights; 
(d) Assist the child, through the attorney's counseling role, to 
consider the consequences of different decisions; and 
(e) Encourage accountability, when appropriate, among the 
different systems that provide services to children. 
 
Id. The 2010 amendments also require that both the state and the guardian 
ad litem notify a child of twelve years old or older of the right to request 
an attorney, and further requires the state and the guardian ad litem to ask 
the child whether he or she wishes an attorney. Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 2.  
Then, in 2014, the legislature again amended RCW 13.34.100. 
Laws of 2014, ch. 108, § 2. The amendments established a right to counsel 
for dependent children where there is no parent remaining with parental 
rights. Id. The amendments also permit judges to appoint counsel to 
children in any dependency action, either sua sponte or “upon the request 
of a parent, the child, a guardian ad litem, a caregiver, or the department.” 
Id. This increased protectiveness of the right to counsel militates strongly 
in favor of independent interpretation. 
Finally, Washington’s contraction of the right of criminal 
defendants to confront witnesses provides an illustrative contrast to the 
expansion of the right to counsel. In State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441, 957 
P.2d 712 (1998), the court observed that over time, Washington statutory 




defendant to confront witnesses, which cut against independent analysis 
under the state constitution. Id. at 463-65 (“In recent years, the exceptions 
to the right have been enlarged….Preexisting law does not support an 
independent analysis of our state confrontation clause in the context of the 
present case.”). Conversely, while federal law does not recognize a right to 
counsel for parents or children, Washington law has expanded to 
recognize a right to counsel for parents both statutorily (RCW 
13.34.090(2)) and constitutionally (Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135; Myricks, 85 
Wn.2d 252), and as discussed above, the legislature has expanded the 
reach of RCW 13.34.100 over time.  
b. Pre-Gunwall Decisions Provide Public Policy Rationales 
for Interpreting Article I, Section 3 as Providing Greater 
Protection than Federal Due Process. 
 
The Gunwall court made clear that the six factors are 
“nonexclusive,” and the Gunwall interpretive tools are certainly no bar to 
the Court examining its own jurisprudence prior to June, 1986, when 
Gunwall was decided. 106 Wn.2d at 58. This Court can and should 
consider Washington’s due process jurisprudence prior to Gunwall. In 
State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984), and State v. 
Davis, 38 Wn. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143 (1984), our courts held that article 
I, section 3 mandated greater protection than federal due process.  




offended by Washington’s death penalty statute, which permitted the jury 
in the sentencing phase to consider any evidence, even if the evidence was 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence. 101 Wn.2d at 640. The Court 
reasoned that article I, section 3 would not tolerate a statute that provided 
lesser protection to those facing a capital sentence, and that the statute was 
“contrary to the reliability of evidence standard embodied in the due 
process clause of our state constitution.” Id. at 640-41. The Court noted 
that even if its analysis were incorrect under federal law, its interpretation 
of article I, section 3 was not constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 639. 
In Davis, Division I of the Court of Appeals held that use of a 
juvenile defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment, regardless of 
whether the silence followed Miranda warnings, was fundamentally unfair 
and violated article I, section 3. 38 Wn. App. at 605. Federal law allowed 
the use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes if 
the defendant had not received Miranda warnings. Id. at 604-05 (citing 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982)). 
The court declined to follow federal law, reasoning that limiting the 
exclusion of post-arrest silence to instances where Miranda warnings are 
given would penalize a defendant who had not been advised of his rights. 




Fletcher “might also encourage police to delay reading Miranda warnings 
or to dispense with them altogether to preserve the opportunity to use the 
defendant’s silence against him.” Id. at 605.  
These cases demonstrate courts relying on policy rationales to 
extend heightened due process protections. This Court’s previous right to 
counsel cases alone justify provision of counsel to children in dependency 
proceedings, and that result is both consistent with other preexisting state 
law and supported by compelling policy rationales. See generally Br. of 




Amicus urges the Court to hold that article I, section 3 requires 
provision of counsel to children in dependency proceedings, due to the 
physical and liberty interests at stake. See Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 
U.S. 551, 557, 60 S. Ct. 676, 84 L. Ed. 920 (1940) (declaring that “state 
courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state 
constitutions”). This development in right to counsel state due process 
jurisprudence will ensure the dignity of children as participants in the legal 
process. Separately, it will provide guidance for lower courts and litigants 
about how to meaningfully employ Gunwall when seeking to develop 
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